Philosophical Studies

, Volume 167, Issue 1, pp 141–163 | Cite as

Running risks morally

Article

Abstract

I defend normative externalism from the objection that it cannot account for the wrongfulness of moral recklessness. The defence is fairly simple—there is no wrong of moral recklessness. There is an intuitive argument by analogy that there should be a wrong of moral recklessness, and the bulk of the paper consists of a response to this analogy. A central part of my response is that if people were motivated to avoid moral recklessness, they would have to have an unpleasant sort of motivation, what Michael Smith calls “moral fetishism”.

Keywords

Normative externalism Moral recklessness Moral uncertainty 

References

  1. Arpaly, N. (2002). Moral worth. Journal of Philosophy, 99, 223–245.Google Scholar
  2. Arpaly, N. (2003). Unprincipled virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Arpaly, N., & Schroeder, T. (1999). Praise, blame and the whole self. Philosophical Studies 93, 161–188.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Arpaly, N., & Schroeder, T. (2014). In praise of desire. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  5. Buchak, L. (2013). Belief, credence and norms. Philosophical Studies. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0182-y.
  6. Calhoun, C. (1989). Responsibility and reproach. Ethics 99, 389–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Finnis, J. (2011). Natural law and natural rights (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, second edition.Google Scholar
  8. Fodor, J. (2000, June 23). It's all in the mind: Noam chomsky and the arguments for internalism. Times Literary Supplement, 3–4.Google Scholar
  9. Guerrero, A. (2007). Don’t know, don’t kill: Moral ignorance, culpability and caution. Philosophical Studies 136, 59–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Harman, E. (2011), Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate? Ratio, 24, 443–468. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00511.x.
  11. Harman, E. (forthcoming). The irrelevance of moral uncertainty. Oxford Studies in Metaethics.Google Scholar
  12. Lockhart, T. (2000). Moral uncertainty and its consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  13. Malmgren, A.-S. (2011). Rationalism and the content of intuitive judgements. Mind, 120, 263–327. doi:10.1093/mind/fzr039.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Moller, D. (2011). Abortion and moral risk. Philosophy, 86, 425–443. doi:10.1017/S0031819111000222.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Sepielli, A. (2009). What to do when you don’t know what to do. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 4, 5–28.Google Scholar
  16. Smith, M. (1994). The moral problem. Oxford: Blackwell Pub. Ltd.Google Scholar
  17. Svavarsdóttir, S. (1999). Moral cognition and motivation. The Philosophical Review, 108, 161–219.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Weatherson, B. (2013). Disagreements, philosophical and otherwise. In D. Christensen & J. Lackey (Eds.), The epistemology of disagreement: New essays (pp. 54–73). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  19. Williamson, T. (2007). The philosophy of philosophy. London: Blackwell Pub. Ltd.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Wolf, S. (1980). Asymmetrical freedom. Journal of Philosophy, 77, 151–166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MichiganMichiganUSA

Personalised recommendations