Philosophical Studies

, Volume 170, Issue 3, pp 377–394

Disagreement behind the veil of ignorance

  • Ryan Muldoon
  • Chiara Lisciandra
  • Mark Colyvan
  • Carlo Martini
  • Giacomo Sillari
  • Jan Sprenger
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-013-0225-4

Cite this article as:
Muldoon, R., Lisciandra, C., Colyvan, M. et al. Philos Stud (2014) 170: 377. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0225-4

Abstract

In this paper we argue that there is a kind of moral disagreement that survives the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. While a veil of ignorance eliminates sources of disagreement stemming from self-interest, it does not do anything to eliminate deeper sources of disagreement. These disagreements not only persist, but transform their structure once behind the veil of ignorance. We consider formal frameworks for exploring these differences in structure between interested and disinterested disagreement, and argue that consensus models offer us a solution concept for disagreements behind the veil of ignorance.

Keywords

Rawls Veil of ignorance Disagreement Consensus modeling Bargaining 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ryan Muldoon
    • 1
  • Chiara Lisciandra
    • 2
  • Mark Colyvan
    • 3
  • Carlo Martini
    • 2
  • Giacomo Sillari
    • 4
  • Jan Sprenger
    • 5
  1. 1.Philosophy, Politics and Economics ProgramUniversity of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphiaUSA
  2. 2.Department of Political and Economic Studies, Finnish Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of the Social SciencesUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland
  3. 3.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of SydneySydneyAustralia
  4. 4.Department of Political ScienceLUISS Guido CarliRomeItaly
  5. 5.Tilburg Center for Logic, General Ethics and Philosophy of ScienceTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands

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