Advertisement

Philosophical Studies

, Volume 168, Issue 3, pp 823–834 | Cite as

Disagreeing about how to disagree

  • Kate Manne
  • David SobelEmail author
Article

David Enoch’s excellent recent book, Taking Morality Seriously, provides a subtle, highly innovative, and stimulating set of arguments for “Robust Realism”: the view that there are normative truths and facts, that such facts exist over and above any set of naturalistic facts, and that our claims about them “amount not just to an expression of any practical attitude, but to a representation of these normative truths and facts.”1

In this paper, we focus on the arguments Enoch gives to help along such a view in Chap. 2 of his book. Enoch’s arguments there are sometimes so complex and nuanced that we think the best way to convey his view is to initially present it in a very streamlined and simplified manner. Then we will introduce some of the complications that Enoch notes. After that, we will try to explain why we do not yet find Enoch’s arguments in Chap. 2 fully convincing.

So, simplifying significantly, Enoch argues in Chap. 2 that it is typically normatively appropriate, when one is...

Keywords

Interpersonal Conflict Moral Disagreement Moral Conflict Dispute Case Coordination Case 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Earlier versions of some of the arguments here have been presented, by Kate Manne, at the 2012 Spawn conference and, by Kate Manne and David Sobel, at the 2012 Eastern APA Symposium on David Enoch’s book Taking Morality Seriously, Oxford University Press, 2011. We are grateful to these audiences for valuable feedback. We are especially grateful to David Enoch for very helpful responses at both of these events, in addition to fun and helpful personal correspondence.

References

  1. Enoch, D. (2005). Why idealize? Ethics, 115, 759–787.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Enoch, D. (2011). Taking morality seriously. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Sobel, D. (2009). Subjectivism and Idealization. Ethics, 119, 336–352.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Cornell UniversityIthacaUSA
  2. 2.SyracuseUSA

Personalised recommendations