Philosophical Studies

, Volume 170, Issue 2, pp 175–198 | Cite as

Affect: representationalists’ headache

Article

Abstract

Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it.

Keywords

Representationalism Affect Affective qualities Transparency Introspection Phenomenal content Pain Pleasure 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of British ColumbiaVancouverCanada
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of California, San DiegoLa JollaUSA

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