Consistency and evidence
Williamson (2000) appeals to considerations about when it is natural to say that a hypothesis is consistent with one’s evidence in order to motivate the claim that all and only knowledge is evidence. It is argued here that the relevant considerations do not support this claim, and in fact conflict with it.
KeywordsKnowledge Evidence E=K Timothy Williamson Gettier
Thanks to Herman Cappelen, Jessica Brown, Aidan McGlynn, Robin McKenna, Sebastian Becker, Andrew Peet, Bruno Jacinto, Michael Hannon, and audiences at the Arche Epistemology Seminar, the University of Edinburgh Epistemology Graduate Conference, and the University of Manchester Open Minds VIII Conference, for helpful comments and feedback on earlier versions of this paper.
- Chisholm, R. (1966). Theory of knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
- Joyce, J. (2004). Williamson on evidence and knowledge. Analytic Philosophy, 45(4), 296–305.Google Scholar
- Kelly, T. (2008). Evidence: Fundamental concepts and the phenomenal conception. Philosophy Compass, 3(5), 933–955.Google Scholar
- McGlynn, A. (manuscript). Knowledge first? Google Scholar
- Neta, R. (2008). What evidence do you have? British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 59, 89–119.Google Scholar
- Pritchard, D. (2012). Anti-luck virtue epistemology. Journal of Philosophy, 109, 247–279.Google Scholar
- Sutton, J. (2007). Without justification. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
- Weatherson, B. (manuscript). E≠K.Google Scholar
- Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar