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Explaining representation: a reply to Matthen

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Notes

  1. So I have said nothing to warrant the attributions that Matthen makes to me in his fn. 1.

References

  • Egan, F. (2013). How to think about mental content. Philosophical Studies. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0172-0.

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  • Horgan, T., & Graham, G. (2012). Phenomenal intentionality and content determinacy. In R. Schantz (Ed.), Prospects for meaning (pp. 321–344). Boston: De Gruyter.

  • Matthen, M. (2013). No explanation without representation: A response to Egan. Philosophical Studies. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0174-y.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA

    Frances Egan

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  1. Frances Egan
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Correspondence to Frances Egan.

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Egan, F. Explaining representation: a reply to Matthen. Philos Stud 170, 137–142 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0166-y

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