Philosophical Studies

, Volume 165, Issue 3, pp 1165–1176

A hesitant defense of introspection


DOI: 10.1007/s11098-013-0148-0

Cite this article as:
Kriegel, U. Philos Stud (2013) 165: 1165. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0148-0


Consider the following argument: when a phenomenon P is observable, any legitimate understanding of P must take account of observations of P; some mental phenomena—certain conscious experiences—are introspectively observable; so, any legitimate understanding of the mind must take account of introspective observations of conscious experiences. This paper offers a (preliminary and partial) defense of this line of thought. Much of the paper focuses on a specific challenge to it, which I call Schwitzgebel’s Challenge: the claim that introspection is so untrustworthy that its indispensability for a genuine understanding of the mind only shows that no genuine understanding of the mind is possible.


Introspection Phenomenology Cognitive science Context of discovery Context of justification 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ArizonaTucsonUSA

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