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Game called on account of fog: metametaphysics and epistemic dismissivism

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Abstract

Is arguing over ontology a mistake? A recent proposal by Karen Bennett suggests that some metaphysical disputes, such as those over constitution and composition, can be dismissed on epistemic grounds. Given that both sides in a dispute try to minimize the differences between them, there are no good metaphysical grounds for choosing between them. In this paper, I expand on her epistemic dismissivism, arguing that given the Quinean conception of the task and method of metaphysics, we are warranted in believing that all ontological disputes will end in a draw, even if they have not yet done so. By a draw, I mean that while both sides in a dispute are genuinely disagreeing about what there is and there are still moves open to them, there are no moves remaining that will advance the discourse further.

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Notes

  1. Church (1958).

  2. See, for example, Schaffer (2009, p. 348).

  3. Thanks to Katrina Elliot and Mark Balaguer for comments on a draft of this paper; to Nancy Bauer, Michael Della Rocca, Ned Markosian, and L. A. Paul for helpful suggestions, and to the participants at the 2012 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference for a vigorous and fruitful discussion.

  4. I am thinking here of the recent collection by Chalmers et al. (2009), Bennett (2009), Schaffer (2009), Hirsch (2009), Thomasson (2009).

  5. Hirsch (2005, 2009).

  6. Bennett (2009, pp. 50–51).

  7. In other disputes, the high ontologist may be more willing to accept a thicker conception of the objects for which she argues. For example, a Platonist about numbers will have a robust conception of numbers; but she will argue in this case that her conception of numbers is absolutely necessary to making sense of (e.g.,) discourse in physics. In other words, a thicker conception of objects is balanced by more stridency in claiming that those objects are necessary. Thanks to Mark Balaguer for pressure on this point.

  8. Bennett (2009, p. 73).

  9. For examples of neo-Meinongian theories as applied to fiction, see Parsons (1980), Zalta (2000), Zalta (2003), Wolterstorff (1980), for creationist theories of fiction van Inwagen (2003), Thomasson (1999, 2003), Voltolini (2006), for irrealist alternatives, Walton (2006), Sainsbury (2010).

  10. Thomasson (2003, pp. 148–151).

  11. Sainsbury (2010, Chap. 6) especially the chart on p. 150.

  12. Pun intended.

  13. For the curious: each side has only a king; one side has a bishop and a king, the other the king alone; one side has a king and a knight; each side has a king and a bishop, and the bishops are on the same color.

  14. This need not accompany a conception of philosophy as bloodsport, with two or more sides fighting over a common discourse in an attempt to persuade each other that they have the better theory. We could instead envision philosophy as an attempt to develop a theory that best explains one’s intuitions, and the same puzzle can arise in a slightly different form, as an internal attempt to ensure that one’s preferred theory accounts for all of one’s intuitions best. In other words, you can play a friendly game of chess against yourself. Thanks to Ned Markosian and Joshua Rasmussen for discussion on this point.

  15. Moreover, if she is inclined to think that theories of slightly different discourses are competitors to her theory, then there are more candidates for the best theory, not fewer, which makes it more reasonable, as we will see, to believe that the dispute will end in a draw. Thanks to Katrina Elliot for pressing this objection.

  16. Thanks to both Katrina Elliot and Mark Balaguer for pressing the sufficiency objection, and to Mark for pointing out that consequences of metaphysical positions often influence acceptance of those positions.

  17. Quine (1966, p. 242).

  18. Bennett (2009, at p. 72).

  19. See, respectively, Sider (2011), Schaffer (2009), Cameron (2012).

  20. See Paul (2012).

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  1. Weber State University, Ogden, UT, USA

    M. B. Willard

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Willard, M.B. Game called on account of fog: metametaphysics and epistemic dismissivism. Philos Stud 164, 1–14 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0097-7

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