Nathan Salmon appeals to his theory of mythical objects as part of an attempt to solve Geach’s Hob–Nob puzzle. In this paper I argue that, even if Salmon’s theory of mythical objects is correct, his attempt to solve the puzzle is unsuccessful. I also refute an original variant of his proposal. The discussion indicates that it is difficult (if not impossible) to devise a genuine solution to the puzzle that relies on mythical objects.
KeywordsHob–Nob puzzle Geach Salmon Mythical objects Intentional identity
Thanks to Andrew Jewell, David Kaplan, Jonathan Levy, Luke Manning, Donald Martin, Adam Masters, Eliot Michaelson, Forrest MV, Terence Parsons, Gabe Rabin, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and discussion. Special thanks to Sam Cumming for his extensive and invaluable help with this paper, and to Nathan Salmon for especially helpful comments and discussion.
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