Philosophical Studies

, Volume 169, Issue 1, pp 39–50 | Cite as

The metaphysical importance of the compatibility question: comments on Mark Balaguer’s Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem

Article

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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of ArizonaTucsonUSA

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