Philosophical Studies

, Volume 158, Issue 2, pp 257–287 | Cite as

Person-affecting views and saturating counterpart relations

  • Christopher J. G. MeachamEmail author


Parfit (Reasons and persons, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984) posed a challenge: provide a satisfying normative account that solves the non-identity problem, avoids the repugnant and absurd conclusions, and solves the mere-addition paradox. In response, some have suggested that we look toward person-affecting views of morality for a solution. But the person-affecting views that have been offered so far have been unable to satisfy Parfit’s four requirements, and these views have been subject to a number of independent complaints. This paper describes a person-affecting account which meets Parfit’s challenge. The account satisfies Parfit’s four requirements, and avoids many of the criticisms that have been raised against person-affecting views.


Repugnant conclusion Non-identity problem Mere-addition paradox Person-affecting view Parfit Counterpart 



I’d like to thank Phil Bricker, Maya Eddon, Fred Feldman, Peter Graham, Elizabeth Harman, Julia Markovits, James Patten, Melinda Roberts, Ted Sider, Dennis Whitcomb, members of 2011 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, and an anonymous referee, for helpful comments and discussion.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MassachusettsAmherstUSA

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