Philosophical Studies

, Volume 164, Issue 2, pp 543–559 | Cite as

Killing, wrongness, and equality

Article

Abstract

This paper examines accounts of the moral wrongness of killing persons in addition to determining what conclusions, if any, can be drawn from the morality of killing persons about the (in)equality of persons, and vice versa. I will argue that a plausible way of thinking about the moral wrongness of killing implies that the permissibility of killing innocent, nonthreatening persons depends on a person’s age. I address objections to this conclusion and discuss some potential implications of the view.

Keywords

Killing Wrongness Equality Respect 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Harvard UniversityBostonUSA

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