Philosophical Studies

, Volume 163, Issue 1, pp 123–131 | Cite as

Replies to critics

  • Dana Kay Nelkin

I am incredibly grateful for all of the wonderful work and excellent criticisms of my critics. I’ve learned a tremendous amount from their thoughtful and laser-like questions, as well as their generously constructive suggestions.1

As I see it, all of the main points of the commentators center around three main topics: the Manipulation Argument as a challenge to compatibilism; my account of abilities; and the commitments of rational deliberation.

The Manipulation Argument

Derk Pereboom’s (2001) 4-Case Manipulation Argument is a powerful challenge to any compatibilist account of free and responsible agency, working by eliciting intuitions about a first case of clear manipulation. The argument proceeds by progressively testing our intuitions about a series of cases claimed to be similar in relevant ways to the first, until we arrive at case 4, which is like the ordinary case with the stipulation that the world is physically determined. If we deny that the agent in case 1 is responsible,...


Thought Experiment Reflective Equilibrium Real Life Case Rational Deliberation Manipulation Argument 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of California, San DiegoSan DiegoUSA

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