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Notes
One might object to the characterization of hallucination as sense experience given that the experience in question does not always result from the relevant correctly functioning sense organs. But this is a terminological point. I use the expression only to characterize that experience that is qualitatively indistinguishable from its veridical counterpart. I also assume here (apologies to disjunctivists) that the best explanation of the indistinguishability is a common intrinsic nature.
I’m setting aside more extreme skepticism of a sort that challenges this sort of justification. Such skepticism is by no means easy to challenge.
Again, I’m setting aside complex epistemological controversies. My own view is that experiences by themselves never actually do the sort of justificatory work we are imagining here. It is only experiences coupled with justified background beliefs about all sorts of factors.
References
Chisholm, R. M. (1966). Theory of knowledge (pp. 10–11). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Fumerton, R., & Foley, R. (1982). Epistemic indolence. Mind, 91, 38–56.
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Fumerton, R. Siegel on the epistemic impact of “checkered” experience. Philos Stud 162, 733–739 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0058-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0058-6