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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 166, Issue 2, pp 329–347 | Cite as

Getting it right

  • Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
  • Stephen R. GrimmEmail author
Article

Abstract

Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present paper considers three objections to truth monism, and argues that, while the truth monist has plausible responses to the first two objections, the third objection suggests that truth monism should be reformulated. On this reformulation, which we refer to as accuracy monism, the fundamental epistemic goal is accuracy, where accuracy is a matter of “getting it right.” The idea then developed is that accuracy is a genus with several species. Believing truly is a prominent species, but it is not the only one. Finally, it is argued that accuracy monism is equally good or better than both traditional truth monism and its main dialectical rival, value pluralism, when it comes to satisfying three important axiological desiderata.

Keywords

Epistemology Value Epistemic value Epistemic goal 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentFordham UniversityBronxUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of KentCanterbury, KentUK

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