Philosophical Studies

, Volume 165, Issue 3, pp 1083–1095 | Cite as

Moral normativity

Article

Abstract

It is a platitude that morality is normative, but a substantive and interesting question whether morality is normative in a robust and important way; and although it is often assumed that morality is indeed robustly normative, that view is by no means uncontroversial, and a compelling argument for it is conspicuously lacking. In this paper, I provide such an argument. I argue, based on plausible claims about the relationship between moral wrongs and moral criticizability, and the relationship between criticizability and normative reasons, that moral facts necessarily confer normative reasons upon moral agents.

Keywords

Morality Reasons Normativity Criticism 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Jefferson College of Health SciencesRoanokeUSA

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