Philosophical Studies

, Volume 163, Issue 2, pp 359–365 | Cite as

A pragmatic solution to Ostertag’s puzzle

Article

Abstract

Gary Ostertag (Philos Stud 146:249–267, 2009) has presented a new puzzle for Russellianism about belief reports. He argues that Russellians do not have the resources to solve this puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena. I argue to the contrary that the puzzle can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s (Frege’s puzzle, 1986) pragmatic account of belief reports, provided that the account is properly understood. Specifically, the puzzle can be solved so long as Salmon’s guises are not identified with sentences.

Keywords

Russellianism Belief reports Frege’s puzzle Semantics Pragmatics 

References

  1. Branquinho, J. (1990). Are Salmon’s ‘guises’ disguised Fregean senses? Analysis, 50, 19–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Braun, D. (1998). Understanding belief reports. The Philosophical Review, 107, 555–595.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Caplan, B. (2007). Millian descriptivism. Philosophical Studies, 133, 181–198.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the way of words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  5. Kripke, S. (1979). A puzzle about belief. In A. Margalit (Ed.), Meaning and use (pp. 239–283). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Ostertag, G. (2009). A problem for Russellian theories of belief. Philosophical Studies, 146, 249–267.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Salmon, N. (1986). Frege’s puzzle. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
  8. Salmon, N. (1989). Illogical belief. In Philosophical perspectives, 3: Philosophy of mind and action (pp. 243–285).Google Scholar
  9. Salmon, N. (1993). Relative and absolute apriority. Philosophical Studies, 69, 83–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Saul, J. (1998). The pragmatics of attitude ascription. Philosophical Studies, 92, 363–389.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Schiffer, S. (1992). Belief ascription. The Journal of Philosophy, 89, 499–521.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Soames, S. (2002). Beyond rigidity. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Speaks, J. (2010). Millian descriptivism defended. Philosophical Studies, 149, 201–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Thau, M. (2002). Consciousness and cognition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  15. Yagisawa, T. (1997). Salmon trapping. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, 351–370.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentUniversity of California, Santa BarbaraSanta BarbaraUSA

Personalised recommendations