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Ryle’s regress defended

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Notes

  1. Ryle anticipates these arguments and provides additional ones in his (1971).

  2. See also Fantl (2009, pp. 460–462).

References

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  1. University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada

    Jeremy Fantl

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  1. Jeremy Fantl
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Correspondence to Jeremy Fantl.

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Fantl, J. Ryle’s regress defended. Philos Stud 156, 121–130 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9800-8

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