Philosophical Studies

, 156:121 | Cite as

Ryle’s regress defended

  • Jeremy FantlEmail author

In his (2010) contribution to the Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy—an early draft of the first chapter of his (2011a) Know How (at the time of this writing, still forthcoming)—Jason Stanley explores in more depth the Rylean arguments for anti-intellectualism that Stanley and Williamson consider and reject in their influential (2001). In particular, he concentrates his efforts on versions of the regress argument that appear in Ryle’s The Concept of Mind,1 arguing that there is no regress that intellectualism is committed to that Rylean anti-intellectualism isn’t. I want to here suggest that there might be.

Intellectualism is a view about the relation between what it is to know that something is the case and what it is to know how to do something. According to intellectualism, the second is a species of the first: what it is to know how to do something just is to know that some relevant thing is the case. For example, for you to know how to ride a bike is just for there to be a way for...


Infinite Number Propositional Knowledge Full Stop Intelligent Action Problematic Regress 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of CalgaryCalgaryCanada

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