Abstract
Physicist Max Tegmark argues that if there are infinite universes or sub-universes, we will encounter our exact duplicates infinite times, the nearest within \( 10^{{10^{115} }} \) m. Tegmark assumes Humean supervenience and a finite number of possible combinations of elementary quantum states. This paper argues on the contrary that Tegmark’s argument fails to hold if possible thoughts, persons, and life histories are all infinite in number. Are there infinite thoughts we could possibly think? This paper will show that there are. If so, then it is not only Tegmark’s specific claim about our duplication that is called into question. We additionally acquire another strong argument against Humean supervenience.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Michael Anderson, Douglas Chute, David Goldberg, Gregory Johnson, Robert Munafo, Allan Stegeman, Somdev Tyagi, Michael Vogely, and David Womack for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I would also like to express my appreciation to an anonymous reviewer, who pointed out to me the way to recover even Abelson’s original argument.
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Porpora, D.V. How many thoughts are there? Or why we likely have no Tegmark duplicates \( 10^{{10^{115} }} \) m away. Philos Stud 163, 133–149 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9790-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9790-6