Bach, K. (2009). Refraining, omitting, and negative acts. In T. O’Connor & C. Sandis (Eds.), Companion to the philosophy of action. Oxford: Wiley–Blackwell.
Bergmann, M. (2005). Defeaters and higher-level requirements. The Philosophical Quarterly,
Brand, M. (1971). The language of not doing. American Philosophical Quarterly,
Braun, D. (1998). Understanding belief reports. The Philosophical Review,
Chisholm, R. (1976). Person and object. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (2004). Evidentialism—Essays in epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crawford, S. (2004). A solution for Russellians to a puzzle about belief. Analysis,
Empricus, S. (1933). Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Friedman, J. (2011). The Doxastic attitudes and evidential norms. D.Phil Thesis, University of Oxford.
Hájek, A. (1998). Agnosticism meets Bayesianism. Analysis,
Loeb, L. E. (1998). Sextus, Descartes, Hume, and Peirce: On securing settled doxastic states. Noûs,
Monton, B. (1998). Bayesian agnosticism and constructive empiricism. Analysis,
Moore, R. E. (1979). Refraining. Philosophical Studies,
Russell, B. (1997). What is an agnostic? In J. G. Slater (Ed.), Bertrand Russell: His works (Vol. 11: Last Philosophical Testament, 1943–1968). London: Routledge.
Salmon, N. (1989). Illogical belief. Philosophical Perspectives,
Salmon, N. (1995). Being of two minds: Belief with doubt. Noûs,
Soames, S. (1995). Beyond singular propositions? Canadian Journal of Philosophy,
Sturgeon, S. (2010). Confidence and coarse-grained attitudes. In Oxford studies in Epistemology (Vol. 3). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Van Fraassen, B. C. (1998). The agnostic subtly probabilified. Analysis,
Wedgwood, R. (2002). The aim of belief. Philosophical Perspectives,