Philosophical Studies

, Volume 157, Issue 1, pp 61–76 | Cite as

Why property dualists must reject substance physicalism

Article

Abstract

I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality.

Keywords

Property dualism David Chalmers Jaegwon Kim Qualia Substance dualism Substance Mind Non-reductive physicalism Consciousness Bundle theory Substratum theory Physicalism Materialism 

References

  1. Armstrong, D. M. (1989a). Universals: An opinionated introduction. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
  2. Armstrong, D. M. (1989b). A combinatorial theory of possibility. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Armstrong, D. M. (1997). A world of states of affairs. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Campbell, K. K. (1981). The metaphysics of abstract particulars. In P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, & H. K. Wettstein (Eds.), Midwest studies in philosophy (Vol. 6). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
  5. Chalmers, D. J. (1997). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  6. Chalmers, D. J. (2002). Consciousness and its place in nature. In D. J. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings. New York: Oxford.Google Scholar
  7. Crane, T. (2003). Mental substances. In A. O’Hear (Ed.), Minds and persons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  8. Graham, G., Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (2009). Consciousness and intentionality. In M. Velmans & S. Schneider (Eds.), Blackwell companion to consciousness. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  9. Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, 32(April),127–136. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Kim, J. (2005). Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Kim, J. (2006). Philosophy of mind (2nd ed.). New York: Westview.Google Scholar
  12. Kreigel, U. (2007). Philosophical theories of consciousness: Contemporary western perspectives. In P. D. Zelazo, M. Moscovitch, & E. Thompson (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  13. Locke, J. (1689). An essay concerning human understanding.Google Scholar
  14. Loux, M. (2002). Metaphysics: A contemporary introduction. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  15. Lowe, E. J. (2006). Non-Cartesian substance dualism and the problem of mental causation. Erkenntnis, 65(1), 5–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Martin, C. B. (1980). Substance substantiated. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58(1), 3–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. O’Leary-Hawthorne, J. (1995). The bundle theory of substance and the identity of indiscernibles. Analysis, 55, 191–196.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Plantinga, A. (2006). Against materialism. Faith and Philosophy, 23(1), 3–32.Google Scholar
  19. Russell, B. (1948). Human knowledge: Its scope and limits. London: Allen and Unwin.Google Scholar
  20. Schneider, S. (forthcoming). The mindbody problem: Rethinking the solution space. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  21. Schneider, S. (ms). Nonreductive physicalism and the mind problem.Google Scholar
  22. Williams, D. C. (1966). The elements of being. In D. C. Williams (Ed.), The principles of empirical realism. Springfield: Charles Thomas.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphiaUSA

Personalised recommendations