Philosophical Studies

, Volume 153, Issue 3, pp 447–455 | Cite as

Phenomenal intentionality and the evidential role of perceptual experience: comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs

Article
  • 140 Downloads

References

  1. Horgan, T. (in press). From agentive phenomenology to cognitive phenomenology: A guide for the perplexed. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (Eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Horgan, T., & Kriegel, U. (in press). The phenomenal intentionality research program. In T. Horgan & U. Kriegel (Eds.), The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (2002). The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality. In D. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings (pp. 520–533). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Horgan, T., Tienson, J., & Graham, G. (2004). Phenomenal intentionality and the brain in a vat. In R. Schantz (Ed.), The externalist challenge (pp. 297–317). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.Google Scholar
  5. Horgan, T., Tienson, J., & Graham, G. (2006). Internal-world skepticism and the self-presentational nature of phenomenal consciousness. In U. Kriegel & K. Williford (Eds.), Self-representational approaches to consciousness (pp. 41–61). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  6. Pitt, D. (2004). The phenomenology of cognition: Or what is it like to think that P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69, 1–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Siewert, C. (1998). The significance of consciousness. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  8. Strawson, G. (1994). Mental reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of ArizonaTucsonUSA

Personalised recommendations