Reply to Belot, Elgin, and Horsten
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Thanks to Gordon Belot, Catherine Elgin, and Leon Horsten for this constructive critique, and especially for confronting me with larger philosophical issues relating to metaphysical realism. While Elgin allows for a gingerly retreat from naïve realism, she points in a direction that bring me squarely into Belot’s sights. Am I caught in a flirtation with the wilder forms of Kantianism? While I insist on strong empirical constraints on our world-picture building, Belot wonders whether these could not turn out to be trivial or incapable of being coherently defined. That in turn hands me over to Horsten for threats to empiricist structuralism. I will address their commentaries in that order.
What is in a map?
Elgin makes her main critical point by implication, and graciously supplies the overall argument for the centrality of the indexical in scientific representation that was lacking. At one point, however, even her improvement still remains vulnerable. I argued that we cannot assimilate...
KeywordsLogical Space Green Thing Transcendental Idealism Contrast Class Unobservable Entity
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