I investigate what it means to have an interpretation of our language, how we manage to bestow a determinate interpretation to our utterances, and to which extent our interpretation of the world is determinate. All this is done in dialogue with van Fraassen’s insightful discussion of Putnam’s model-theoretic argument and of scientific structuralism.
KeywordsScientific Theory Causal Theory Ontological Structuralism Linguistic Community Liar Sentence
Thanks to Igor Douven and to my colleagues in Bristol for helpful discussions. The research for this project was supported by an AHRC project on Foundations of Structuralism (AH/H001670/1).
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