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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 150, Issue 3, pp 449–459 | Cite as

Having an interpretation

  • Leon HorstenEmail author
Article

Abstract

I investigate what it means to have an interpretation of our language, how we manage to bestow a determinate interpretation to our utterances, and to which extent our interpretation of the world is determinate. All this is done in dialogue with van Fraassen’s insightful discussion of Putnam’s model-theoretic argument and of scientific structuralism.

Keywords

Scientific Theory Causal Theory Ontological Structuralism Linguistic Community Liar Sentence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Igor Douven and to my colleagues in Bristol for helpful discussions. The research for this project was supported by an AHRC project on Foundations of Structuralism (AH/H001670/1).

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of BristolBristolUK

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