Philosophical Studies

, Volume 152, Issue 1, pp 1–15 | Cite as

The rationalism in Anil Gupta’s Empiricism and Experience

  • Karl SchaferEmail author


In these comments I briefly discuss three aspects of the empiricist account of the epistemic role of experience that Anil Gupta develops in his Empiricism and Experience. First, I discuss the motivations Gupta offers for the claim that the given in experience should be regarded as reliable. Second, I discuss two different ways of conceiving of the epistemic significance of the phenomenology of experience. And third, I discuss whether Gupta’s account is able to deliver the anti-skeptical results he intends it to. I close by suggesting that, once fully fleshed out, Gupta’s account is best understood in terms of the fusion of certain core ideas within both the empiricist and the rationalist traditions.


Gupta Empiricism Experience Epistemology Phenomenology Skepticism 



Many thanks to Anil Gupta and Kathryn Lindeman for helpful discussion of these issues.


  1. Gupta, A. (2006). Empiricism and experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Hawthorne, J. (2002). Deeply contingent a priori knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65, 2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Peacocke, C. (2004). The realm of reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Pryor, J. (2000). The skeptic and the dogmatist. Noûs, 34, 517–549.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, 1001 Cathedral of LearningUniversity of PittsburghPittsburghUSA

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