Abstract
Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these theoretical aims, I propose that a central phenomenon is shared intention. I argue that an adequate understanding of the distinctiveness of the intentions of individuals allows us to provide a construction of attitudes of the participants, and of relevant inter-relations and contexts that constitutes shared intention. I explain how shared intention, so understood, differs from a simple equilibrium within common knowledge. And I briefly contrast my views with aspects of views of John Searle and Margaret Gilbert.
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Notes
Gilbert (1990).
See Gilbert (2000).
Gilbert (2000, pp. 19, 22).
Williams (1981, p. 111).
This point has also been insightfully emphasized by Facundo Alonso under the guise of what he calls “Hume’s challenge”. See Alonso (2008).
In formulating the agglomeration principle in this way I have benefited from Yaffe (2004, pp. 510–522).
For some complexities see Bratman (1999b, pp. 143–144).
See Searle (1990).
Kutz (2000, pp. 86-88).
C. List and P. Pettit (Identifying group agents, unpubl.).
Searle (1990).
See Bratman (1999b). Given our interest in robust sufficient conditions, I include here a common knowledge condition, though I do not try to provide an analysis of this idea, and I will not try to discuss whether such common knowledge is strictly necessary for each to intend that we so act.
Bardsley (2007, p. 145).
In this paragraph I have benefited from discussion with Facundo Alonso.
And recall that we have already appealed to a similar, though more limited, condition in our effort to explain the idea, in (i), of my intending that we J.
Searle (1990, pp. 413–415).
A question that is highlighted by Gold and Sugden (2007).
Gold and Sugden remark that “Bratman might object that it is too glib to interpret P1’s intending that J come about ‘because of’ P2’s intention as the idea that P1 believes that P2 has the corresponding intention and acts on the basis of this belief” (Gold and Sugden (2007, p. 115)) On my view, this identification of intending with belief is, quite simply, false.
I am agreeing here with Bjorn Petersson, who credits Tim Crane for introducing the term “causal agent”. However, I do not agree with Petersson that this poses a problem for my theory. See Petersson (2007, esp. p. 148).
Philip Pettit and David Schweikard interpret Gilbert in this way in Pettit and Schweikard (2006, p. 32).
In correspondence (December, 2008) Gilbert has indicated her preference for this second reading, citing Gilbert (2006, pp. 144–145).
In Bratman (2007) I sketch an approach to self-governance that draws substantially from the planning theory.
References
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This is an overview of some of the ideas in a forth-existing and as yet untitled monograph on shared agency. Some parts of this essay are drawn from my essay “Shared Agency,” in Chris Mantzavinos, ed., Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice (Cambridge University Press) (Bratman forthcoming). I thank Cambridge University Press for their permission to use this copyrighted material here. Earlier versions of many of these ideas come, in turn, from a quartet of essays of mine on this subject reprinted in Bratman (1999a). Earlier versions of the present essay were presented at the Pacific APA, March 2008; the Bristol Workshop on Joint Agency, July 2008; Rutgers University, September 2008; the Florence G. Kline Workshop on Collective Action and Agency at the University of Missouri, October 2008; and Princeton University, November 2008. I have benefited from these occasions—in particular from the prepared comments of Abraham Roth at the APA session and from Paul Weirich at the Missouri workshop, and from correspondence from Kirk Ludwig in the wake of the Missouri workshop. My thinking about these issues has benefited over the years from numerous interactions with Margaret Gilbert and, more recently, from interactions with Scott Shapiro and Facundo Alonso. Work on this essay was supported in part by a Fellowship at the Stanford University Humanities Center.
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Bratman, M.E. Modest sociality and the distinctiveness of intention. Philos Stud 144, 149–165 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9375-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9375-9
Keywords
- Modest sociality
- Planning theory of intention
- Shared intention
- Shared agency
- Joint action
- Margaret Gilbert
- John Searle