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Compatibilism & desert: critical comments on four views on free will

Philosophical Studies volume 144, pages 3–13 (2009)Cite this article

Abstract

In this paper I offer from a source compatibilist’s perspective a critical discussion of Four Views on Free Will by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Sharing Fischer’s semi-compatibilist view, I propose modifications to his arguments while resisting his coauthors’ objections. I argue against Kane that he should give up the requirement that a free and morally responsible agent be able to do otherwise (in relevant cases). I argue against Pereboom that his famed manipulation argument be resisted by contending that the agents in it are free and responsible. And I also argue against Vargas by challenging the sense in which his revisionist thesis differs from a position like Fischer’s and mine. I close by reflecting on the nature of desert. All seem to assume it is central to the debate, but what is it?

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Notes

  1. For helping me to get clear on the questions that follow, especially the first two, I am indebted to Randolph Clarke, who first brought these issues to my attention in his fall 2007 seminar on Moral Responsibility at Florida State University.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Florida State University, 151 Dodd Hall, Tallahassee, FL, 32306-1500, USA

    Michael McKenna

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  1. Michael McKenna
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Correspondence to Michael McKenna.

Additional information

For helpful comments I would like to thank Randolph Clarke, John Martin Fischer, Alfred Mele, and Derk Pereboom.

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McKenna, M. Compatibilism & desert: critical comments on four views on free will . Philos Stud 144, 3–13 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9373-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9373-y

Keywords

  • Free will
  • Moral responsibility
  • Determinism
  • Compatibilism
  • Source compatibilism desert
  • Manipulation
  • PAP
  • Revisionism
  • Fischer
  • Kane
  • Pereboom
  • Vargas