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Replies to Perner and Brandl, Saxe, Vignemont, and Carruthers

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Notes

  1. I am indebted to Holly M. Smith for extremely valuable discussion and suggestions that markedly improved my contribution to this symposium.

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Correspondence to Alvin I. Goldman.

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Goldman, A.I. Replies to Perner and Brandl, Saxe, Vignemont, and Carruthers. Philos Stud 144, 477–491 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9358-x

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