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Simulation and the first-person

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Abstract

This article focuses on, and critiques, Goldman’s view that third-person mind-reading is grounded in first-person introspection. It argues, on the contrary, that first-person awareness of propositional attitude events is always interpretative, resulting from us turning our mind-reading abilities upon ourselves.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, 1125 Skinner Building, College Park, MD, 20742, USA

    Peter Carruthers

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  1. Peter Carruthers
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Correspondence to Peter Carruthers.

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Carruthers, P. Simulation and the first-person. Philos Stud 144, 467–475 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9357-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9357-y

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