Philosophical Studies

, Volume 148, Issue 3, pp 413–438 | Cite as

The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it, and how to cope with it

Article

Abstract

Metaethical—or, more generally, metanormative—realism faces a serious epistemological challenge. Realists owe us—very roughly speaking—an account of how it is that we can have epistemic access to the normative truths about which they are realists. This much is, it seems, uncontroversial among metaethicists, myself included. But this is as far as the agreement goes, for it is not clear—nor uncontroversial—how best to understand the challenge, what the best realist way of coping with it is, and how successful this attempt is. In this paper I try, first, to present the challenge in its strongest version, and second, to show how realists—indeed, robust realists—can cope with it. The strongest version of the challenge is, I argue, that of explaining the correlation between our normative beliefs and the independent normative truths. And I suggest an evolutionary explanation (of a pre-established harmony kind) as a way of solving it.

Keywords

Moral realism Moral epistemology 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The Philosophy DepartmentThe Hebrew University in JerusalemJerusalemIsrael

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