Philosophical Studies

, Volume 142, Issue 1, pp 17–26 | Cite as

Knowledge and success from ability



This paper argues that knowledge is an instance of a more general and familiar normative kind—that of success through ability (or success through excellence, or success through virtue). This thesis is developed in the context of three themes prominent in the recent literature: that knowledge attributions are somehow context sensitive; that knowledge is intimately related to practical reasoning; and that one purpose of the concept of knowledge is to flag good sources of information. Wedding these themes to the proposed account helps to explain a wide range of standard Gettier problems. It also helps to explain barn façade cases, which require a different kind of treatment.


Knowledge Intellectual virtue Gettier cases Barn façade cases 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Saint Louis UniversitySt. LouisUSA

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