The open future: bivalence, determinism and ontology
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In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.
KeywordsOpen future Metaphysical indeterminacy Logical fatalism Determinism Growing block
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