Abstract
We begin with a puzzle: why do some know-how attributions entail ability attributions while others do not? After rejecting the tempting response that know-how attributions are ambiguous, we argue that a satisfactory answer to the puzzle must acknowledge the connection between know-how and concept possession (specifically, reasonable conceptual mastery, or understanding). This connection appears at first to be grounded solely in the cognitive nature of certain activities. However, we show that, contra anti-intellectualists, the connection between know-how and concept possession can be generalized via reflection on the cognitive nature of intentional action and the potential of certain misunderstandings to undermine know-how even when the corresponding abilities and associated propositional knowledge are in place. Such considerations make explicit the intimate relation between know-how and understanding, motivating a general intellectualist analysis of the former in terms of the latter.
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Notes
We will understand know-how attributions to be instances of the schema ⌈ x knows how to ψ ⌉, which should be distinguished from instances of the schemas ⌈ x knows how one ψ−s⌉, ⌈ x knows how people ψ ⌉, ⌈ x knows how y ψ−s⌉, and so on (see Stanley and Williamson 2001, Snowdon 2004, Noë 2005, Bengson, J., & Moffett, M. A., Radical intellectualism, Unpublished Manuscript). By ‘know-how’, then, we mean knowledge how to perform a given activity, rather than mere knowledge how one performs or people perform or a particular person performs that activity. Our preferred account of these distinctions is sketched in note 34 below.
The salchow (pronounced sal-kow), named after the Swedish skater Ulrich Salchow, is a figure skating jump with a takeoff from a back inside edge and landing on the back outside edge of the opposite foot after one or more rotations in the air. The quintuple salchow would then require five complete rotations in the air. To our knowledge, no skater has ever landed a quintuple salchow. Of course, nothing substantial turns on our choice of this particular complex activity. One might know how to dunk a basketball yet be unable to do so oneself. Another example, due to Stanley and Williamson (2001, 416), who in turn credit Jeff King, involves a ski instructor who knows how to do complex ski stunts which she cannot do herself.
Of course, nothing substantial turns on our choice of this particular activity. Knowing how to do conjunction elimination or take the successor likewise appear to require possession of the corresponding abilities.
It is important that anti-intellectualism requires the corresponding ability; one need not be an anti-intellectualist in order to allow that some ability (e.g., the ability to breathe or think or apply concepts) might be required for know-how. One implication is that Noë’s (2005, 285–286) modified regress argument poses no threat to intellectualism.
The absence of a baseball bat in your present immediate environment, for instance, does not undermine your ability to hit a baseball, though it does undermine your ability to hit a baseball right now. That the inability to ψ right now is consistent with the ability to ψ is a consequence of the fact that abilities are stable, in the sense that one typically retains them even in inauspicious conditions—as when, e.g., one is asleep, nervous, inebriated, temporarily injured, in an unsympathetic environment, and so on (Ryle 1946, 1949; Hawley 2003; Noë 2005; see also Stanley and Williamson 2001). Of course, while some impediments to action do not undermine ability, others—e.g., chronic paralysis, amnesia, or death—do. The moderate sensitivity of ability attributions to impediments to action might be best handled by a dispositional or conditional account of ability (Sosa 1993). An alternative strategy is to invoke descriptive predication (Bealer 1993; Moffett 2003) to analyze ability attributions as, say, a kind of generic attribution. Either way, one implication of the stability of abilities for the present discussion is that the plethora of cases in which one knows how to ψ but for one reason or another is merely unable to ψ right now are not successful counterexamples to anti-intellectualism.
The problem here is reminiscent of Meno’s paradox.
Roughly, stereotypical implicatures rely on the heuristic that what is simply described is stereotypically exemplified (Levinson 2001). Our arguments above that ability is not necessary for know-how and our arguments in Sect. 4 that ability is not sufficient for know-how do not affect the present point, since cases in which ability and know-how come apart appear to be atypical.
As Soames (2002, 68) observes in a somewhat different context, “When ordinary speakers are asked what sentences mean, often they do not address themselves to the question of [semantic meaning]. Instead, they focus on what they would typically use the sentences to convey, or what information they would typically gather from assertive utterances of them.” This and related phenomena are important confounding variables which arise when polling ordinary speakers. Still, we believe that carefully constructed surveys could be used to test Noe’s prediction. Elsewhere (Bengson, J., Moffett, M. A., & Wright, J. The folk on knowing how, Unpublished Manuscript) we report the results of empirical studies showing that, contrary to Noë’s prediction, most English speakers do in fact judge both that the ski instructor is unable to do the jumps and that she knows how to do them. Only a small minority, perhaps influenced by the stereotypical implicature described in the text, make judgments consistent with anti-intellectualism.
Thanks to Derek Ball, Josh Brown, Andy Egan, Shieva Kleinschmidt, Elia Zardini, and Aaron Zimmerman for pressing this objection with cases like the ones that follow.
We believe that the initial feasibility of the counterexample turns in part on what we take to be a mistaken underlying assumption, namely, that performance errors in cognitive tasks which arise from non-cognitive neurological processes do not affect conceptual mastery. In Sect. 3, we observe that an adequate grasp of the concept addition (plus) is required for knowing how to add. But someone who always applies the subtraction function when attempting to add has at least as tenuous a grasp of the concept plus as Burge’s (1979) patient has of the concept arthritis. That the conceptual error arises from an underlying neurological disorder, rather than a mistaken empirical belief, does not affect this point.
Carr does not consider our puzzle as such, though he is aware of the need for an account of the peculiar behavior of know-how attributions we identified at the outset. His account, which we will argue is unsatisfactory, posits a distinction between “strong” and “weak” senses of know-how attributions, only the former of which are synonymous with ability attributions.
It is worth emphasizing that even if in these cases know-how attributions are necessarily equivalent to ability attributions, that is not sufficient to show that in these cases knowing how is identical with being able, since logical equivalence does not entail identity. For example, Bealer (1982) has argued (in our view, convincingly) that intensional entities (e.g., propositions) can be logically equivalent without being identical.
It is possible that stressing one of the occurrences of ‘knows how to’ would result in multiple readings. But this could be explained by the well-known fact that focal stress regularly affects meaning. In this regard, it is worth bearing in mind that multiple readings are not sufficient, though they are necessary, for ambiguity (Zwicky and Sadock 1975, 4–5). Incidentally, the preceding tests would remain appropriate even if a single reading of ‘knows how to’ was keyed by the type of activity invoked in the complement clause, for in such a case the inappropriate reading(s) would nevertheless still be available.
Certain comments by Koethe (2002, 327) and Rumfitt (2003) might be taken to suggest that knowing how to wiggle one’s ears entails the ability to do so. It is tempting to say the same about basic activities (in Goldman’s sense), such as walking, in which case know-how attributions entail ability attributions when such activities are found in the complement of the attitude. But we believe that this is not so. Consider, for instance, an expert in the anatomical underpinnings of facial appendage-wiggling who knows, for any facial appendage, precisely which muscles he must flex in order to wiggle that appendage. Over the course of many years, he has used this knowledge to teach himself to wiggle his nose, which he now does with ease. An aspiring ear-wiggler, he practices wiggling his ears daily, though to his frustration he has never succeeded. Of course, he knows how to wiggle his ears: this is, in part, why his failure is so frustrating. We believe that to the extent that it is possible to know how to perform basic activities, they can be given a similar treatment. For discussion of the felicity of know-how attributions concerning basic activities, see Katzoff (1984), Stanley and Williamson (2001), 440 n. 46, and Snowdon (2004, 12–13). For further discussion of ear-wiggling cases, see Sect. 4.
This might be one way to read the quote from Carr in Sect. 2. See also Hetherington (2006, 91).
In Sect. 1 we noted that understanding how to ψ implies knowing how to ψ. The present claim, which concerns understanding (not understanding how), is a more substantive one which ultimately ties certain cases of know-how to the grasp of concepts. In Sect. 4 we discuss the connections between know-how, understanding, and concept possession more generally.
Similarly, we merely possess the concept extremal black hole, whereas Cumrun Vafa and Andrew Strominger, the theoretical physicists who used so-called “string theory” to account for certain features of a particular class of black holes (Greene 1999, 338 ff.), have reasonable mastery of it. Arguably, since one cannot have a given propositional attitude unless one possesses the concepts involved in its content, simply having an attitude with the content that a is F is sufficient for having some grasp, however tenuous, of a concept of Fs (Siebel 2004). Obviously, reasonable mastery requires more than this (see note 36).
While it is widely acknowledged that concept possession comes in degrees, the distinctions between mere possession, reasonable mastery, and full mastery come in many (subtly different) flavors. For instance, Bealer (1998, 2004a) distinguishes between nominal and determinate possession of a concept; Burge (1990), explicating Frege, between merely grasping a concept and having a sharp (full, clear, thorough) grasp of it; Crimmins (1989), between merely having any idea whatsoever and having a normal idea; Higginbotham (1998), between merely possessing a concept and having an adequate conception of it. There is also the distinction between partial or incomplete understanding versus misunderstanding of a concept (Burge 1979; Bealer 1998, 2004a). Needless to say, we will remain neutral with regard to the details of each of these proposals.
By ‘relevant concepts’, we simply mean the concepts reasonable mastery of which is necessary and sufficient for understanding the select activity in question.
The only plausible alternative explanation seems to be that Irina does not have reasonable mastery of certain other concepts, such as one, two, or equals. But for the purpose of the example we can suppose that she does.
We leave it open that some such attributions entail reasonable mastery of ability-based concepts. Even so, they will not entail reasonable mastery of the corresponding ability-based concepts (i.e., a concept reasonable mastery of which entails the ability to perform the very activity in question). For instance, knowing how to prove Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem plausibly requires reasonable mastery of the concept proof and reasonable mastery of this concept might entail the ability to do simple proofs (e.g., certain proofs by modus ponens). But it does not entail being able to do the Incompleteness proof itself.
Interestingly, even Ryle (1949, 41 ff.) observed this connection between know-how and understanding, writing that “Understanding is a part of knowing how” (54). In defense of his claim that know-how is not mere “blind habit” but requires “intelligence” (understanding), Ryle pointed out that “[a] boy is not said to know how to play [chess], if all that he can do is to recite the rules accurately...Similarly, a foreign scholar might not know how to speak grammatical English...for all that he had mastered the theory of English grammar.” Ryle goes on to note the significant difference between merely being able “to give by rote the correct solutions of multiplication problems” and knowing how to multiply (42). Of course, we need not accept Ryle’s view that understanding is competent performance to acknowledge his important insight that there is a general connection between know-how and understanding.
A full exposition and defense of the theory, which might properly be labelled radical intellectualism, is beyond the scope of this paper. For detailed discussion, see Bengson and Moffett (Unpublished Manuscript). See also Bengson et al. (Unpublished Manuscript).
If this is correct, then neo-Ryleanism, according to which know-how is equivalent to ability, is doubly wrong: not only is being able to ψ not generally necessary for knowing how to ψ, but contra Ryle (1946, 1949 ch. 2), Brandom (1994, 23), Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1996, 131), Haugeland (1998, 322), and Noë (2005), it is not sufficient either.
Mark Sainsbury has suggested to us that a repairman might know how to fix your dishwasher even though he does not know that some way w is a way to fix your dishwasher (because he is on holiday and so does not know that your dishwasher is broken). Of course, such a repairman knows that w is a way to fix a dishwasher which has the problem that your dishwasher actually has. This appears to be sufficient for knowing that w is a way to fix your dishwasher (on the reading of ‘your’ operative in, e.g., ‘Irina has your kind nature’), in which case the example is consistent with the necessity claim. Alternatively, he does not have this last bit of knowledge; but then he merely knows how to fix a dishwasher which has the problem your dishwasher actually has, and thus does not know how to fix your dishwasher (on the reading of ‘your’ operative in, e.g., ‘No one else can have your kind nature’)—in which case the example is again consistent with the necessity claim.
If propositional knowledge—either de dicto or de re (Brown 1970)—implies the corresponding bit of objectual knowledge, then clause (i) can be dispensed with in favor of clause (ii) alone. We will remain neutral on this issue, as well as on whether w must be a contextually relevant way of ψ-ing, as Stanley and Williamson (2001) and Brogaard (Forthcoming) claim.
We momentarily put to one side Stanley and Williamson’s appeal to a certain mode of presentation under which the relevant proposition is known. Incidentally, although we believe that Stanley and Williamson’s analysis is correct in the fundamentals, because we hold a radically different conception of linguistic analysis, we do not find their reasoning for the conclusion that the biconditional they offer captures the logical form of know-how attributions persuasive (see Moffett 2005). In our view, their biconditional should, like (†) (and (‡) below), be interpreted as a standard, garden variety philosophical analysis and not as a linguistic claim, or a thesis about the logical form of know-how attributions.
These observations follow from (but ultimately do not rest on) Burge’s (1979) arguments concerning linguistic externalism and concept possession together with epistemic fallibilism.
We can suppose, if need be, that Irina has mastery of the simple concepts back, inside, outside, and edge: she is confused only about the complex concepts back inside edge and back outside edge. Compare the familiar case of mistaking a right turn of the dial for a left turn of the dial. One might be competent with dials, turns, and the difference between right and left, and thus have mastery of the concepts dial, turn, and right, yet still be confused about whether a right turn of the dial involves movement of the top or the bottom of the dial to the right. As a result, one might take a right turn of the dial to be a left turn of the dial. As per Burge, we take it that such misunderstanding is consistent with attributing to such a person possession of the concept right turn of the dial and associated propositional attitudes. In particular, it is consistent with attributing knowledge that, for instance, a right turn of the dial will increase the volume. Thanks to David Christenson for suggesting this example and to Louis de Rossett for the question that prompted it.
In fact, as indicated by the considerations which follow, it is a counterexample to any account which denies that reasonable mastery of certain concepts is necessary for know-how. Accordingly, this case exposes the fundamental inadequacy of neo-Ryleanism (see note 25), as well as more sophisticated theories which hold that know-how is a state with a certain sort of nonconceptual content.
More generally, we are unhappy with Stanley and Williamson’s appeal to practical modes of presentation, which is intended to solve the problem posed by certain cases of mere demonstrative knowledge, for three reasons. (1) We are skeptical of the viability of a hidden-indexical solution to fine-grained intensionality (see Bealer 2004b). Some of the problems with that proposal will carry over to Stanley and Williamson’s proposal as well. Moreover, if hidden-indexicalism is not required for an adequate theory of fine-grained intensionality, then invoking such modes of presentation in the present case threatens to be unacceptably ad hoc. (2) Like Koethe (2002), Schiffer (2002), and Rosefeldt (2004), we find the appeal to practical modes of presentation unconvincing. In our case, this is largely due to the fact that we are unclear about what exactly such modes are supposed to be. (3) The problem posed by certain cases of mere demonstrative knowledge goes away once we observe that knowledge how to ψ requires understanding, as suggested by the preceding example. So, there is no need to invoke practical modes of presentation, since an independently motivated condition (understanding) for know-how provides an adequate solution. (Alternatively, it might be possible to construe the understanding requirement as a way of articulating the notion of knowledge under a practical mode of presentation, though there are good reasons to doubt that this is what Stanley and Williamson intended.)
We believe that this point, like our broader point concerning the importance of understanding to know-how, suggests the inadequacy of popular analyses of knows-wh constructions.
Allowing that the understanding in question may be implicit. We believe that clauses (ii) and (iii) together entail clause (i), which we leave for the sake of perspicuity. We also believe that clause (iii) enables us to properly distinguish knowledge how to ψ from knowledge how one ψ-s and associated states: the former, but not the latter, requires a minimal understanding of w. Finally, as suggested by the discussion to follow, clause (iii) entails that x has reasonable mastery of the concepts in the proposition in clause (ii).
On certain views about the nature of analysis, it is possible to understand a correct and complete conception of w as an analysis of w. Then we could state this requirement equivalently as: x minimally understands w if and only if x has reasonable mastery of the concepts in an analysis of w (and their mode of combination). However, we believe that this approach is acceptable only if what is required is an intensionally correct conception. We are doubtful, however, that the requirement is this strong; extensional correctness appears to be adequate.
Roughly, x has reasonable mastery of a concept C if and only if x is able to apply C correctly in core cases (under normal cognitive conditions). Of course, this ability is to be distinguished from the ability to correctly employ C in simple ways, which is a substantive performance ability (e.g., the ability to perform the task of adding one and one) and not merely an ability to apply the concept. (In the special case of ability-based concepts, however, the ability to apply the concept entails the performance ability, and vice versa.) Now, we have no general theory of what counts as a core case. In fact, we are doubtful that this can be settled other than on a case-by-case (or, perhaps, category-by-category) basis. Roughly, however, the core cases are those in which a general failure to correctly apply the concept implies that the subject at most merely possesses the concept. Consider Burge’s (1979) contract example. Presumably, not knowing whether or not a contract may be verbal is not sufficient for denying that the person has reasonable mastery of the concept contract. By contrast, not knowing whether or not a contract has normative force (i.e., generates an obligation) would be.
The importance of proprioception for concept formation is discussed in Lakoff (1987).
Some readers will be comfortable with the claim that the child’s concept of doing this constitutes her conception of the concept of muscular contraction and that this is adequate for reasonable mastery of the latter concept (for a discussion of conceptions of concepts, see Higginbotham 1998). Our position is not affected by this further debate.
This discussion suggests an answer to Noë’s (2005, 285) challenge to the intellectualist to identify “what [it is] about the distinctive kind of propositional knowledge in which knowing how to do something consists that should make it the case that situation and embodiment play such an essential role”. Thanks to Josh Brown for suggesting the couch potato example, and to Ishani Maitra and Brian Weatherson for related discussion.
This objection was raised by Kevin Falvey.
This raises the issue of animal know-how, which is both interesting and delicate. Consistent with ordinary usage and work in contemporary cognitive ethology (Allen and Bekoff 1999) we take it that animals across a wide range of taxa possess mental states (including propositional attitudes). But since, on our view, know-how is more conceptually demanding than propositional knowledge, we are committed to either denying that animals can possess know-how or accepting that they can have reasonable mastery of certain concepts. Although there will no doubt be some relatively clear cut cases (e.g., chimpanzees know how to extract termites from their nests), we think that most cases should be decided by the best explanatory theory of animal behavior. In those cases where attributions of know-how are scientifically indispensable, we are comfortable with the corresponding attributions of reasonable conceptual mastery. (Of course, many attributions of know-how to cognitively unsophisticated animals, such as the caddis fly larvae (Wallis Forthcoming), may in fact be ultimately scientifically dispensable. For, presumably, many such attributions can be replaced without loss by attributions of reliable ability or, at most, so-called ‘procedural knowledge’, which is importantly distinct from know-how, as many cognitive scientists recognize (Stillings et al. 1995, 396).) As in the case of young children, the fact that some animals may be able to attain such mastery reflects, in our opinion, the relatively light cognitive demands such mastery often imposes.
Earlier versions of the present paper were presented at a graduate colloquium at the University of Texas at Austin, the 2006 Mountain-Plains Philosophy Conference, and a symposium at the 2007 Pacific APA. Thanks to audiences at those events and, in particular, Derek Ball, George Bealer, Josh Brown, David Christenson, Jonathan Dancy, Louis de Rossett, Andy Egan, Kevin Falvey, Franz-Peter Griesmaier, Shieva Kleinschmidt, Ishani Maitra, Aidan McGlynn, Doug Patterson, Mark Sainsbury, Brian Weatherson, Jennifer Wright, Elia Zardini, and Aaron Zimmerman for helpful comments and discussion.
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Bengson, J., Moffett, M.A. Know-how and concept possession. Philos Stud 136, 31–57 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9146-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9146-4
Keywords
- Know-how
- Concept possession
- Ability
- Propositional knowledge
- Understanding
- Intellectualism