Abstract
It is agreed on all hands that the original version of the conditional analysis of dispositions is defeated by so-called finks and maskers. Some have responded to this predicament by contending that the counterfactual on the right-hand side of the analysis should be expected to hold only when the property it purports to describe is in normal conditions. The essay argues that at the end of the day this idea must presuppose that one is able to arrive at specific descriptions of the factors interfering with the manifestation of a disposition, which calls into question its utility.
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Notes
Bird (1998), p. 228.
Martin (1994), pp. 2ff.
Bird (1998), p. 228.
Lewis (1997), esp. p. 157.
In maintaining that the simple conditional analysis postulates a causal link between the combination of a disposition (or its distinct causal base) with some external conditions and its manifestation, I go beyond what the analysis explicitly avers. This construal of the simple analysis is tacitly presupposed by the manner in which the two main problems facing it are standardly presented, and allows it to escape a few minor difficulties. An explicit assertion of the causal link would result in a version of what Molnar calls the causal conditional analysis. (Cf. Lewis, (1997), pp. 143f; Molnar (2003), pp. 84–92). The descendants of the simple analysis that follow below will also be interpreted causally.
See, for example, Mumford (1998, pp. 87f).
Malzkorn (2000, pp. 456–459), Wiggins (1986, section 13) and Wright (1992, pp. 113f) invoke normal conditions in their discussions of values and secondary qualities. Mumford (1998, pp. 89–91) appeals to “ideal conditions” (which in most cases are identical with normal ones) in drawing the distinction between dispositional and categorical concepts. Bird indicated some sympathy with the appeal to normal conditions in his “Dispositions and Antidotes” (p. 233), but he no longer seems to countenance it (2004, sections 5 and 6). Handfield (2001, p. 491) expresses skepticism about the invocation of normal conditions in the conditional analysis. The example of internal packaging is Johnston’s (1992, p. 233).
Malzkorn (2000), p. 459.
The coldest place is said to be in the Boomerang Nebula, with the temperature of 1 K. (Cf. Sahai and Nyman (1997), p. L155.
The lowest temperature ever obtained was 100 pK, or 1 × 10–10 K. (Cf. Knuuttila et al. (2000), p. 1700).
In regarding some conditions, namely the constituents of the complete cause of the manifestation of a disposition, as causally relevant, I depart slightly from what seems to be the prevalent view about what causal relevance applies to. Usually causal relevance is thought to pertain to those features of causes, which are responsible for bringing about their effects. (Cf. McKitrick (2005), pp. 359f).
I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this journal for drawing my attention to this line of argument.
Bird (2004), Sects. 5 and 6.
Earman et al. (2002), pp. 283–292.
It my happen that the factors excluded by a ceteris paribus clause would grow so numerous that the analysis of a dispositional property would become rather bloated. As a result, we might well lose interest in the property. But it could still be in a good metaphysical standing: not all properties must be simple enough for our mind to get an easy hold of them.
Cf. Molnar (2003), pp. 21f.
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Acknowledgement
I am grateful to Alexander Bird, John T. Roberts, and an anonymous referee for this journal for helpful comments.
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Hauska, J. Dispositions and normal conditions. Philos Stud 139, 219–232 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9114-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9114-z