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Problems for virtue theories in epistemology

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Abstract

This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism. Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with pluralism and the nature of the self; and problems with pluralism and the goals of epistemology. Moral objections to virtue theory are identified––specifically, both the idea that there can be a radical axiological priority to character and the anti-enlightenment tendencies in virtues approaches. Finally, some strengths to virtue theory are conceded, while the role of epistemic luck is identified as an important topic for future work.

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  1. Department of Psychology, Thames Valley University, St. Mary’s Rd., Ealing, London, W5 5RF, UK

    Robert Lockie

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  1. Robert Lockie
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Correspondence to Robert Lockie.

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Lockie, R. Problems for virtue theories in epistemology. Philos Stud 138, 169–191 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9030-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9030-7

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