Abstract
The Brock-Rosen problem has been one of the most thoroughly discussed objections to the modal fictionalism bruited in Gideon Rosen’s ‘Modal Fictionalism’. But there is a more fundamental problem with modal fictionalism, at least as it is normally explained: the position does not resolve the tension that motivated it. I argue that if we pay attention to a neglected aspect of modal fictionalism, we will see how to resolve this tension—and we will also find a persuasive reply to the Brock-Rosen objection. Finally, I discuss an alternative reading of Rosen, and argue that this position is also able to fend off the Brock-Rosen objection.
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Liggins, D. Modal fictionalism and possible-worlds discourse. Philos Stud 138, 151–160 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9001-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9001-z