Skip to main content

On characterizing the physical

Philosophical Studies volume 131, pages 61–99 (2006)Cite this article

Abstract

How should physical entities be characterized? Physicalists, who have most to do with the notion, usually characterize the physical by reference to two components,1

1. The physical entities are the entities treated by fundamental physics with the proviso that

2. Physical entities are not fundamentally mental (that is, do not individually possess or bestow mentality).

Here I will explore the extent to which appeals to fundamental physics and to the NFM (no fundamental mentality) constraint are appropriate for characterizing the physical, especially for purposes of formulating physicalism. I will motivate and defend a version of an account incorporating both components.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Access options

Buy single article

Instant access to the full article PDF.

USD 39.95

Price includes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

References

  • D.M. Armstrong (1997) A World of States of Affairs Cambridge Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • S. Auyang (1999) How is Quantum Field Theory Possible? Oxford University Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • K. Campbell (1967) ‘Materialism’ Paul Edwards (Eds) Encyclopedia of Philosophy Collier–Macmillan New York/London 179–188

    Google Scholar 

  • K. Campbell (1997) ArticleTitle‘Review of Physicalism; the Philosophical Foundations’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 223–226 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2953791

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, R. (1966): Philosophical Foundations of Physics, New York: Basic Books. Reprinted by Dover in 1995 as An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science

  • D. Chalmers (1996) The Conscious Mind Oxford University Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • D.J. Chalmers F. Jackson (2001) ArticleTitle‘Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation’ The Philosophical Review 110 315–360 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2693648

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • N. Chomsky (1972) Language and Mind Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich New York

    Google Scholar 

  • N. Chomsky (1980) Rules and Representations Columbia University Press New York

    Google Scholar 

  • T. Crane H. Mellor (1990) ArticleTitle‘There is No Question of Physicalism’ Mind 99 185–206 Occurrence Handle10.1093/mind/XCIX.394.185

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • S. Crook C. Gillett (2001) ArticleTitle‘Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the ‘Physical’: Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Formulation of Physicalism’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 333–360

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1970): ‘Mental Events’, in L. Foster and J. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Amherst: Massachusetts University Press. Reprinted in Davidson 1980

  • D. Davidson (1980) Essays on Actions and Events Oxford University Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Dowell, J. (this volume): ‘The Physical: Empirical, not Metaphysical’, Philosophical Studies 131(1), 25–60

  • G. Gates (2001) ‘Physicalism, Empiricism, and Positivism’ Carl Gillett Barry Loewer (Eds) Physicalism and Its Discontents Cambridge University Press Cambridge 251–267

    Google Scholar 

  • G. Hellman (1985) ArticleTitle‘Determination and Logical Truth’ Journal of Philosophy 82 607–616 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2026415

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • G. Hellman F. Thompson (1975) ArticleTitle‘Physicalism: Ontology, Determination, and Reduction’ Journal of Philosophy 72 551–564 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2025067

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • C. Hempel (1965) Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science The Free Press New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Hempel, C. (1969): ‘Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets’, in Patrick Suppes, Sidney Morgenbesser and Morgan White (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays In Honor of Ernest Nagel (pp. 179–199), St. Martin’s

  • C. Hempel (1980) ArticleTitle‘Comments on Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking’ Synthese XLV 193–199 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00413558

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • F. Jackson (1998) From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis Oxford University Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • J. Kim (1996) Philosophy of Mind Westview Press Boulder

    Google Scholar 

  • J. Kim (2001) ‘Mental Causation and Consciousness: The Two Mind-Body Problems for the Physicalist’ Carl Gillett Barry Loewer (Eds) Physicalism and Its Discontents Cambridge University Press Cambridge 272–283

    Google Scholar 

  • R. Kirk (1994) Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness Oxford University Press New York

    Google Scholar 

  • R. Kirk (1996) ArticleTitle‘Physicalism Lives’ Ratio (New Series) 9 85–89

    Google Scholar 

  • P. Kitcher (1980) ArticleTitle‘Arithmetic for the Millian’ Philosophical Studies 37 215–236 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00372444

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D. Lewis (1983) ArticleTitle‘New Work for a Theory of Universals’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 343–377 Occurrence Handle10.1080/00048408312341131

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • B. Loewer (2001) ‘From Physics to Physicalism’ Carl Gillett Barry Loewer (Eds) Physicalism and Its Discontents Cambridge University Press Cambridge 37–56

    Google Scholar 

  • A. Melnyk (1997) ArticleTitle‘How to Keep the “Physical” in Physicalism’ Journal of Philosophy 94 622–637 Occurrence Handle10.2307/2564597

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Melnyk, A. (2006): ‘Conceptual and Linguistic Analysis: A Two-Step Program’ (in progress)

  • J.S. Mill (1843) A System of Logic Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer London

    Google Scholar 

  • B. Montero (1999) ArticleTitle‘The Body Problem’ Nous 33 183–200 Occurrence Handle10.1111/0029-4624.00149

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • B. Montero (2001) ArticleTitle‘Post-Physicalism’ Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 61–80

    Google Scholar 

  • Montero, B. (2005): ‘Physicalism in an Infinitely Decomposable World’, Erkenntnis

  • T. Nagel (1985) The View from Nowhere Clarendon Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • D. Papineau (1993) Philosophical Naturalism Basil Blackwell Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • D. Papineau (2001) ‘The Rise of Physicalism’ Carl Gillett Barry Loewer (Eds) Physicalism and Its Discontents Cambridge University Press Cambridge 3–36

    Google Scholar 

  • P. Pettit (1995) ArticleTitle‘Microphysicalism, Dottism, and Reduction’ Analysis 55 141–146 Occurrence Handle10.2307/3328570

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • J. Poland (1994) Physicalism; the Philosophical Foundations Clarendon Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Poland, J. (2003): ‘Chomsky’s Challenge to Physicalism’, in Louise Antony and Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics, Blackwell Publishing

  • I. Ravenscroft (1997) ArticleTitle‘Physical Properties’ Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 419–431 Occurrence Handle10.1111/j.2041-6962.1997.tb00844.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Salmon, W. (1990): ‘Rationality and Objectivity in Science or Tom Kuhn Meets Tom Bayes’, in C. Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories (pp. 174–204), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 14

  • D. Spurrett D. Papineau (1999) ArticleTitle‘A Note on the Completeness of Physics’ Analysis 59 IssueID1 25–29 Occurrence Handle10.1111/1467-8284.00144

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • R. Stalnaker (2003) Ways a World Might Be Clarendon Press Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Stoljar, D. (2001): ‘Physicalism’, Stanford On-line Encyclopedia of Philosophy

  • G. Witmer (2001) ‘Sufficiency Claims and Physicalism’ Carl Gillett Barry Loewer (Eds) Physicalism and Its Discontents Cambridge University Press Cambridge 57–73

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada

    Jessica Wilson

Authors
  1. Jessica Wilson
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jessica Wilson.

Additional information

See Hellman and Thompson (1975), Papineau (1993), Kirk (1994), Ravenscroft (1997), Papineau (2001), and Loewer (2001) for variations on this theme. These accounts appropriately assume that the physical entities are those existing at relatively low orders of complexity, so that, e.g., the identity theorist’s claim that mental entities are identical to physical entities should be understood, more precisely, as the claim that mental entities are identical to physically acceptable entities (e.g., micro-structural properties), which will not be among the relatively fundamental entities treated by physics; and the claim that physics is causally complete should be understood, more precisely, as the claim that every physically acceptable effect has a physically acceptable cause. The account I will eventually endorse differs in certain key respects from any endorsed thus far.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Wilson, J. On characterizing the physical. Philos Stud 131, 61–99 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-5984-8

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-5984-8

Keywords

  • Moral Agency
  • Body Problem
  • Physical Entity
  • Mental Causation
  • Future Physic