Abstract
Resemblances obtain not only between objects but between properties. Resemblances of the latter sort – in particular resemblances between quantitative properties – prove to be the downfall of a well-known theory of universals, namely the one presented by David Armstrong. This paper examines Armstrong’s efforts to account for such resemblances within the framework of his theory and also explores several extensions of that theory. All of them fail.
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Eddon, M. Armstrong on Quantities and Resemblance. Philos Stud 136, 385–404 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-5384-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-5384-5