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Epistemicism and Nihilism about Vagueness: What’s the Difference?

Abstract

In this paper I argue, first, that the only difference between Epistemicism and Nihilism about vagueness is semantic rather than ontological, and second, that once it is clear what the difference between these views is, Nihilism is a much more plausible view of vagueness than Epistemicism. Given the current popularity of certain epistemicist views (most notably, Williamson’s), this result is, I think, of interest.

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Correspondence to David Enoch.

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Enoch, D. Epistemicism and Nihilism about Vagueness: What’s the Difference?. Philos Stud 133, 285–311 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-5337-z

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Keywords

  • Error Theory
  • Ethical Discourse
  • Vague Predicate
  • Vague Term
  • Neutral Term