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On Logics of Knowledge and Belief

Philosophical Studies volume 128, pages 169–199 (2006)Cite this article

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachussetts Avenue, 32D-808, Cambridge, MA, 02139, USA

    Robert Stalnaker

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  1. Robert Stalnaker
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Correspondence to Robert Stalnaker.

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Stalnaker, R. On Logics of Knowledge and Belief. Philos Stud 128, 169–199 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-4062-y

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