Philosophical Studies

, Volume 135, Issue 3, pp 335–362 | Cite as

The Benefits of Coming into Existence

  • Krister BykvistEmail author


This paper argues that we can benefit or harm people by creating them, but only in the sense that we can create things that are good or bad for them. What we cannot do is to confer comparative benefits and harms to people by creating them or failing to create them. You are not better off (or worse off) created than you would have been had you not been created, for nothing has value for you if you do not exist, not even neutral value.


Normative Invariance Absolute Sense Happy Life Moral Distinction Consequentialist Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy FacultyJesus College, Oxford UniversityOxfordUK

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