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Primeness, Internalism and Explanatory Generality

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Abstract

Williamson (2000) [Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues that attempts to substitute narrow mental states or narrow/environmental composites for broad and factive mental states will result in poorer explanations of behavior. I resist Williamson’s arguments and use Twin-Earth style cases to argue for the causal inertness of broad mental states.

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  1. Department of Philosophy Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 26 Nichol Ave, New Brunswick, NJ, 08901, USA

    Bernard Molyneux

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  1. Bernard Molyneux
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Correspondence to Bernard Molyneux.

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Molyneux, B. Primeness, Internalism and Explanatory Generality. Philos Stud 135, 255–277 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-2330-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-2330-5

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