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Phenomenal Properties as Dummy Properties

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Abstract

Can the physicalist consistently hold that representational content is all there is to sensory experience and yet that two perceivers could have inverted phenomenal spectra? Yes, if he holds that the phenomenal properties the inverts experience are dummy properties, not instantiated in the physical objects being perceived nor in the perceivers’ experiences. In fact, he should probably hold that phenomenal properties don’t exist at all. All there are, as far as phenomenal properties go, are phenomenal property experiences.

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  1. Michigan State University and Hiram College, P.O.Box 235, Hiram, OH, 44234–0235, USA

    Richard J. Hall

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  1. Richard J. Hall
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Hall, R.J. Phenomenal Properties as Dummy Properties. Philos Stud 135, 199–223 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-1064-8

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