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Vague Expectation Value Loss

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Abstract

Vague subjective probability may be modeled by means of a set of probability functions, so that the represented opinion has only a lower and upper bound. The standard rule of conditionalization can be straightforwardly adapted to this. But this combination has difficulties which, though well known in the technical literature, have not been given sufficient attention in probabilist or Bayesian epistemology. Specifically, updating on apparently irrelevant bits of news can be destructive of one’s explicitly prior expectations. Stability of vague subjective opinion appears to need a more complex model.

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  1. Philosophy Department, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 08544, USA

    Bas C. Van Fraassen

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  1. Bas C. Van Fraassen
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Correspondence to Bas C. Van Fraassen.

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Van Fraassen, B.C. Vague Expectation Value Loss. Philos Stud 127, 483–491 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7821-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7821-2

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