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Strong And Weak Possibility

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Abstract

The thesis of existentialism holds that if a proposition p exists and predicates something of an object a, then in any world where a does not exist, p does not exist either. If “possibly, p” entails “in some possible world, the proposition that p exists and is true,” then existentialism is prima facie incompatible with the truth of claims like “possibly, the Eiffel Tower does not exist.” In order to avoid this claim, a distinction between two kinds of world-indexed truth –and two associated kinds of modality –is needed. This paper embodies an attempt to develop a full account of just such a distinction.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, 151 Dodd Hall, Tallahassee, FL, 32306-1500, USA

    Jason Turner

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  1. Jason Turner
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Correspondence to Jason Turner.

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Turner, J. Strong And Weak Possibility. Philos Stud 125, 191–217 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7812-3

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