Abstract
Some philosophical positions maintain that some aspect of reality depends on human practices, cognitive attitudes or sentiments. This paper presents a framework for understanding such positions in a way that renders them immune to a number of natural but allegedly devastating objections.
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Einheuser, I. Counterconventional Conditionals. Philos Stud 127, 459–482 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7790-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7790-5