Why is it that we think today so very differently about distributive and retributive justice? Why is the notion of desert so neglected in our thinking about distributive justice, while it remains fundamental in almost every account of retributive justice? I wish to take up this relatively neglected issue, and put forth two proposals of my own, based upon the way control functions in the two spheres.
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Smilansky, S. Control, Desert and the Difference between Distributive and Retributive Justice. Philos Stud 131, 511–524 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7486-x