Abstract
The paper discusses one of the central arguments in Dennett’s Freedom Evolves, an argument designed to show that a deterministic universe would not necessarily be a universe of which it could truly be said that everything that occurs in it is inevitable. It suggests that on its most natural interpretation, the argument is vulnerable to a serious objection. A second interpretation is then developed, but it is argued that without placing more weight on etymological considerations than they can really bear, it can deliver only a significantly qualified version of the conclusion that Dennett is seeking. Moreover, the new argument depends upon an intermediate conclusion which, on the face of it, looks to be self-contradictory. Dennett is able to avoid the appearance of self-contradiction only by utilising a possible-worlds framework for the understanding of “could have done otherwise” judgements which is argued to be unsatisfactory. It is suggested that a different framework might hold the key to understanding how better to defend these same judgements from purported threats from determinism.
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Steward, H.C. Determinism and Inevitability. Philos Stud 130, 535–563 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-5955-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-5955-x