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Frankfurt-Style Cases and Improbable Alternative Possibilities

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Abstract

It has been argued that a successful counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities must rule out any possibility of the agent making an alternative decision right up to the moment of choice. This paper challenges that assumption. Distinguishing between an ability and an opportunity, this paper presents a Frankfurt-style case in which there is an alternative possibility, but one it is highly improbable that the agent will access. In such a case the agent has only the opportunity, not the ability to do otherwise.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Durham, 50 Old Elvet, Durham, DH1 3HN, UK

    Gerald K. Harrison

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  1. Gerald K. Harrison
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Correspondence to Gerald K. Harrison.

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Harrison, G.K. Frankfurt-Style Cases and Improbable Alternative Possibilities. Philos Stud 130, 399–406 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-5753-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-5753-5

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