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On an Argument for Humility

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Abstract

Considerations upon the nature of properties and laws have led some philosophers to claim that the correct epistemic attitude with regards to the intrinsic properties of particulars is scepticism. I examine one particularly clear version of this line of argument, and contend that a serious form of scepticism is not established. However, I argue that the theories of properties and laws underlying the argument have unwanted metaphysical implications. These provide a stronger reason to jettison the analyses. I end by sketching an alternative view that avoids these difficulties.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Birkbeck College, London, WC1E 6BT, UK

    Ann Whittle

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  1. Ann Whittle
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Whittle, A. On an Argument for Humility. Philos Stud 130, 461–497 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-5751-7

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